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NOTES
MULTINATIONAL "PAYOFFS" ABROAD:
INTERNATIONAL REPERCUSSIONS AND DOMESTIC
LIABILITIES
I. INTRODUCTION
The vast resources and diverse activities of multinational
corporations have made them a controversial phenomenon. At-
tention has largely been focused upon the conflict between the
search of the multinational enterprise [hereinafter referred to as
MNE] for capital growth and the interests of the host States in
which it operates.' Analysis of the problems caused by MNE's has
focused upon the manner in which they function, their impact on
host States, and the effect of their activities on international
relations. Many writers have asserted that MNE's must be sub-
ject to regulation.' The attitude of MNE's is reflected in a state-
ment by Mr. A. Gerstacker, Chairman of the Dow Chemical Com-
pany:
The anational company may be the major hope in the world
today for economic cooperation among people, for prosperity
among nations, for peace in our world. I have long dreamed of
buying an island owned by no nation, and of establishing the
world headquarters of the Dow company on the truly neutral
ground of such an island, beholden to no nation or society.'
A new facet to the controversy has developed in the past two years
because directors and officers of United States MNE's have ad-
mitted payment of large sums of money to officials of foreign
governments. Disclosures before Senate subcommittees, at an-
nual meetings of shareholders, and in the press reveal the nature,
if not the extent, of such MNE disbursements.
1. See generally R. BARNEr & R. MULLER, GLOBAL REACH (1974); THE INTERNATIONAL
CORPORATION (C. Kindleberger ed. 1970); REICH, Global Responsibilities for the
Multinationals, 8 TExAs INT'L L.J. 187 (1973). For an analysis of the deleterious effects of
regulation, see Rubin, Developments in the Law and Institutions of International Eco-
nomic Relations, The Multinational Enterprise at Bay, 68 AM.J. INT'L L. 475 (1974).
2. Griffin, The Power of Host Countries Over the Multinational: Lifting the Veil in
the European Economic Community and the United States, 6 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 375
(1974).
3. A. Gerstacker, Chairman of the Dow Chemical Company, remarks at the White
House Conference on the Industrial World Ahead, February 8, 1972, cited in Reich, supra
note 1, at 187.
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In the United States, corporate contributions have been pro-
hibited with respect to federal office4 and most state and local
offices.5 As Justice Reed commented in relation to the predecessor
of the Corrupt Practices Act (now the Federal Election Campaign
Act):'
This legislation seems to have been motivated by two considera-
tions. First, the necessity for destroying the influence over elec-
tions which corporations exercised through financial contribu-
tions. Second, the feeling that corporate officials had no moral
right to use corporate funds for contribution to political parties
without the consent of the stockholders.7
Although the federal statute is not directed toward contributions
to foreign election campaigns, it does indicate a public policy
against the use of corporate assets to influence the political
sphere.' Whether or not corporations have violated any existing
laws, Senator Charles Percy has predicted that Congress will
enact specific legislation requiring that United States MNE's
divorce themselves from foreign politics and report all contribu-
tions wherever they are made.9
4. Federal Election Campaign Act, 18 U.S.C. § 606 et seq. (1970), as amended,
(Supp. II, 1972).
5. See, e.g., New York ELEC. L. § 480 (McKinney 1974).
6. Act of Jan. 28, 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864, as amended, Federal Election Campaign
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972).
7. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 113 (1948).
8. See notes 11 & 12 infra.
9. N.Y. Times, June 5, 1975, at 53, col. 5.
Congress has begun to move in the direction predicted by Senator Percy; on Novem-
ber 12, 1975 the Senate passed a resolution by a 93-0 vote. S. Res. 265, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess., 121 CONG. REC. S19812 (1975). The resolution "called on U.S. trade diplomats to
negotiate an 'international code of conduct' aimed at stopping bribes and kickbacks in
business transactions by global corporations." Wall Street Journal, Nov. 13, 1975, at 12,
col. 3. This Senate resolution strongly manifests Congressional intent to deter, if not
prohibit, payments by MNE's to government officials.
A prior indication of the Congressional mood was a bill introduced by Senator Frank
Church, S. 2239, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), entitled Intervention in Political Affairs of
Foreign Countries. The legislation read, in pertinent part:
SEC. 2. It is unlawful for any citizen or resident of the United States to
offer to make, or make, a contribution to any agency of the United States for
the purpose of influencing the outcome of an election for public office in a foreign
country.
SEC. 3. It is unlawful for any officer, employee, or agent of the United
States (1) to solicit any citizen or resident of the United States to contribute
to, or make an expenditure in support of, any candidate or political party,
directly or indirectly, for the purpose of influencing the outcome of an election
for public office in a foreign country, or (2) to accept a contribution from any
citizen or resident of the United States for such purpose.
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Legislation prohibiting domestic political contributions by
corporations has existed since 1907.1° Such legislation is designed
to mitigate the influence a corporation can wield due to the huge
accumulations of capital which are available for contributions,
and to protect shareholders from directors and officers who
make such a gift of corporate assets without their consent (and,
in the case of foreign payments, often without their knowledge).
The Federal Election Campaign Act defines "election" to include
virtually every primary, special, general, or runoff election for
federal office." The term "contributions" has been broadened to
encompass every conceivable thing of value, including loans, used
to influence the election of any person to federal office.'
While no United States court has held that payments of
corporate assets to foreign governments is a violation of the com-
mon law or statutory duties of a director or officer, the courts have
condemned domestic political contributions. An analysis of the
case law is necessary to delineate public policy regarding corpo-
rate political contributions.
This note will analyze the jurisdictional problems that share-
holders may encounter when instituting derivative suits against
MNE's which have made political payments abroad. The bases
upon which United States courts can assert jurisdiction under
principles of emergent and customary international law will be
examined. In addition, the grounds for such derivative suits
under both the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 [hereinafter re-
ferred to as the Act] and state law will be discussed.
The bill was considered by the Multinational Subcommittee and passed by the
Senate. Although not enacted, S.2239 was merely an initial attempt to regulate political
activity of American multinational enterprises abroad as the subsequent Senate resolution
clearly indicates.
10. Act of Jan. 28, 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864.
11. Federal Election Campaign Law, 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970), as amended, (Supp. II,
1972).
12. This section, which prohibits such contributions, specifically excludes "the estab-
lishment, administration, and solicitation of contributions to a separate segregated fund
to be utilized for political purposes by a corporation . . . provided such contributions to
the fund are voluntary and not coerced by the corporation from its employees." The use
of such "segregated funds" raises problems not considered in this note. In regard to
guidelines for corporations desirous of establishing such funds and an analysis of the law,
see Fletcher, Corporate Political Contributions, 29 Bus. LAWYER 1071-1100 (1974). It would
appear that corporations may use their corporate assets to administer such funds. Id.
Corporations may solicit employees to contribute to such funds, the only requirement
being clear segregation and "voluntariness." Cf. Pipefitters Local 562 v. United States,
407 U.S. 385 (1972); United States v. Boyle, 482 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1076 (1973).
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II. BACKGROUND
In April of 1973, Harold Geneen, the chairman of the Interna-
tional Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, testified before the
Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corpo-
rations [hereinafter referred to as Multinational Subcommit-
tee]. Mr. Geneen admitted that ITT had, on two occasions, of-
fered $1,000,000 to the Central Intelligence Agency "to prevent
the election of the late Chilean President, the Marxist Dr. Salva-
dore Allende Gossens." Both offers were refused.' 3
On May 16, 1975, an official Honduran investigation com-
mission identified its former Economic Minister, Abraham Ben-
naton Ramos, as the recipient of a $1,250,000 bribe from United
Brands Corporation; the bribe was paid by the huge fruit export-
ing company to obtain favorable tax treatment on banana ship-
ments.'4 The Honduran government reported that the bribe was
given to Bennaton by a United Brands executive in Zurich in
September of 1974."1 The money was traced through the Paris
branch of the Chase Manhattan Bank to the Zurich office of the
Swiss Credit Union."6
On May 24, 1975, Elio Scotto, the chief state prosecutor of
Italy, announced that a judicial inquiry was being conducted
concerning charges that United Brands had given Italian govern-
ment officials $750,000 between 1970 and 1974 to obtain favored
treatment for banana shipments to Italy. On May 22, 1975, the
Securities and Exchange Commission announced that it had filed
charges against United Brands for attempting to conceal the
"true scope and extent" of the payment of bribes to foreign gov-
ernment officials to obtain reduction of banana export taxes.'8
Several shareholders of United Brands have filed suit against the
directors and officers of the corporation to recover the corporate
funds paid as bribes to the Honduran government.19
The Chairman of the Board of Gulf Oil Corporation, Robert
R. Dorsey, testified before the Multinational Subcommittee that
in 1966 the corporation had provided the late President of Bolivia,
13. N.Y. Times, August 20, 1975, at 59, cal. 6.
14. Id. May 16, 1975, at 1, cal. 8.
15. Id.
16. Id. May 21, 1975, at 61, cal. 2.
17. Id. May 24, 1975, at 33, cal. 1.
18. Id. May 22, 1975, at 65, cal. 2.
19. Id. April 11, 1975, at 45, cal. 7; id. April 12, 1975, at 33, cal. 3.
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Rene Barrientos Ortuna, with a $110,000 helicopter.20 Payments
of $240,000 and $110,000 were made to Ortuna's political party
as well. 1 Mr. Dorsey further testified that Gulf may have made
political contributions in Italy." He also admitted that some
$5,000,000 in illegal political contributions had been made
abroad. Of that amount, Gulf had paid $4,000,000 to the South
Korean Democratic Republican Party; $3,000,000 of these pay-
ments had occurred in 1971 after the Party's finance chief, S.K.
Kim, had demanded $10,000,000.23 Mr. Dorsey explained to the
Subcommittee that all of the payments were made through a Gulf
subsidiary, Bahamas Exploration, with the knowledge of only
four or five Gulf officers. In urging federal prohibition of such
payments so that MNE's might resist pressure to contribute, Mr.
Dorsey complained that the State Department did not help
United States corporations which had such problems abroad. 4
On May 23, 1974, Gulf shareholders filed suit against Gulf direc-
tors and officers to recover funds distributed as political pay-
ments in foreign nations.2
Richard W. Millar, the Chairman of Northrop Corporation,
also testified before the Multinational Subcommittee. Mr. Millar
disclosed that bribes totaling $450,000 were paid to two Saudi
Arabian generals in 1972 and 1973.28 Mobil Oil Corporation has
admitted making political contributions in Italy 7 and Canada.28
At an annual stockholders' meeting in May of 1975, J.K.
Jamieson, Chairman of the Exxon Corporation, disclosed that its
subsidiary, Exxon Italiano, had contributed to political parties in
Italy l and that its Imperial Oil subsidiary had made contribu-
tions to Canadian campaigns. Orin E. Atkins, the Chairman
20. Testimony of Robert R. Dorsey, Chairman of the Board of Gulf Oil Corporation,
May 16, 1975, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Multinational Corporations of the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Comm., 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 12 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings Before the Multinational Subcommittee].
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. N.Y. Times, May 23, 1975, at 40, col. 5.
26. Testimony of Richard W. Millar, Chairman of the Executive Comm. of Northrop
Corporation, June 9, 1975, Hearings Before the Multinational Subcommittee.
27. Testimony of Mr. Checkett, Vice President of Mobil Oil Corporation, July 17,
1975, Hearings Before the Multinational Subcommittee.
28. Id.
29. N.Y. Times, May 16, 1975, at 47, col. 2.
30. Id. May 17, 1975, at 37, col. 6.
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and Chief Executive of Ashland Oil, admitted at Ashland's an-
nual meeting that almost $500,000 in corporate funds had been
paid to foreign government officials.3'
In testimony before the Senate Banking Committee, Daniel
G. Haughton, the Chairman of Lockheed Aircraft Corporation,
admitted the company's long-standing practice of paying what he
termed "kickbacks" to foreign governments in order to obtain
contracts. He acknowledged that Lockheed had spent at least
$22,000,000 in this manner.2
Payments by United States MNE's abroad are customary, if
not institutionalized. 3 The activities of the corporations dis-
cussed here are merely illustrative.
III. JURISDICTION
MNE's "account to no single national authority, and since
international law is feeble or nonexistent, they are free of interna-
tional authority as well."34 The lack of a coordinated interna-
tional approach to MNE's presents jurisdictional problems when
suit is brought against a corporation; as a consequence of corpo-
rate structure MNE's transcend the jurisdictional sovereignty of
31. Id. Aug. 22, 1975, at 39, col. 2.
32. Id. Aug. 26, 1975, at 1, col. 1. The Lockheed Corporation has had its loans secured
by the federal government through the Emergency Guarantee Board.
33. See Gwertzman, Is Bribery Defensible?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1975, 6 (Magazine),
19.
Corporate contributions to foreign political parties have created controversy in foreign
nations. The Honduran government has filed criminal charges against Bennaton, the
alleged recipient of $1,250,000 from United Brands, and against a United Brands subsidi-
ary. N.Y. Times, May 18, 1975 at 54, col. 1. The government of Iran has announced that
in the future foreign companies securing government contracts will be required to file an
affadavit that no unauthorized payments have been made. Id., June 10, 1975 at 61, col.
8.
International concern over corporate payments was also expressed in the preliminary
draft of a "multinational code of conduct" promulgated by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development. Id., Oct. 27, 1975, at 41, col. 8. The draft of the code'
provides that "within the framework of laws and regulations of the host. . . the company
observe the best standards set by relevant local customs and practices." Id., Oct. 27, 1975,
at 41, col. 8. Despite the weak phrasing of this provision, the code represents an initial
attempt to control MNE conduct. Other code guidelines call for disclosure of information
by MNE's and require MNE's to avoid practices which would "concentrate their economic
power." Id., Oct. 27, 1975, at 42, col. 5. Although the code is not compulsary, MNE's that
"depart radically from the guidelines would probably find it more difficult to do busi-
ness." Id., Oct. 27, 1975, at 41, col. 8.
34. Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Eco-
nomic Policy of the Joint Economic Comm., 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 935 (1970), cited in
Reich, supra note 1, at 187.
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the individual nations in which they operate. In many instances
a subsidiary corporation is economically, but not legally, synony-
mous with a parent MNE. Because of this relationship, suit
against a subsidiary located in one State must necessarily be
predicated upon jurisdiction over a parent which is situated in
another country.
Principles of International Law
Pursuant to recognized principles of international law, the
jurisdiction of national courts must be predicated upon either
nationality or territoriality." A State may regulate the conduct
of its nationals wherever they reside." According to the Restate-
ment (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
[hereinafter referred to as Restatement] a corporation has "the
nationality of the state which creates it.""3 The applicability of a
State's laws to activities conducted within its geographical
boundaries" is based upon the subjective territorial principle; for
acts of a national which occur outside its geographical boundaries
jurisdiction is based upon the nationality principle. When politi-
cal payments are made in the United States or directly through
a United States corporation abroad, United States courts clearly
have jurisdiction over the transaction. 9
Problems arise when payments made by a United States
parent MNE are channelled through a subsidiary which is incor-
porated in a foreign State. The subsidiary corporation which
makes the payment is an alien and therefore not subject to
United States jurisdiction under the traditional theories. By rely-
ing upon expanded concepts of international principles, however,
a plaintiff shareholder can successfully obtain jurisdiction.
The principle of nationality, as applied to corporations, has
been broadly interpreted. The courts have not uniformly adhered
35. See 1 G. HACKwORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 11; 8 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW H9 7 & 16.
36. See 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw § 145 (8th ed. Lauterpacht 1955);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 30 (1) (h)
(1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT] offers an even broader basis in protecting the
"interests" of a national: "[a]s to the status of a national or as to an interest of a national,
wherever the thing or other subject matter to which the interest relates is located."
37. RESTATEMENT § 27.
38. Id. § 17: OPPENHEIM, supra note 36, § 43; WHITEMAN, supra note 35, vol. 1, § 16,
at 241 (1963).
39. OPPENHEIM, supra note 36. Such jurisdiction must be tempered somewhat by the
doctrine of comity. See text accompanying notes 67-77 infra.
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to the theory that incorporation is the exclusive criterion of na-
tionality, 0 and commentators have also questioned its efficacy.,1
Ian Brownlie has pointed out the artificiality of construing corpo-
rate nationality by situs of incorporation alone:
The attribution of legal persons (personnes morales) to a partic-
ular state for the purpose of applying a rule of domestic or inter-
national law is commonly based upon the concept of nationality.
The borrowing of a concept developed in relation to individuals
is awkward in some respects but is now well established. A
major point of distinction is the absence of legislative provisions
in municipal law systems which create a national status for
corporations: domestic nationality laws do not concern them-
selves with corporations. The consequences of this are twofold.
First, the nationality must be derived either from the fact of
incorporation, i.e. creation as a legal person, within the given
system of domestic law, or from various links including the
centre of administration (si~ge social), and the national basis of
ownership and control. Secondly, the content of the nationality
tends to depend on the context of the particular rule of law
involved: nationality appears more as a functional attribution
of tracing and less as a formal and general status of the kind
relating to individuals."
The United States, particularly in the enforcement of its anti-
trust, securities, and tax laws, has often "insisted on treating as
domestic corporations . . .businesses incorporated in foreign
countries but having substantial financial links with the United
States and its citizens."4
Expansion of corporate nationality has also been approved in
the official comments of the Restatement:
When the nationality of a corporation is different from the na-
tionality of the persons (individual or corporate) who own or
control it, the state of the nationality of such persons has juris-
diction to prescribe, and to enforce in its territory, rules of law
governing their conduct. It is thus in a position to control the
conduct of the corporation even though it does not have
40. Cf. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975); IIT v. Vencap,
Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
41. See generally Griffin, supra note 2; I. BROWNUE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1973).
42. Brownlie, supra note 41, at 408-09.
43. Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 69
COLUM. L. REv. 94, 96 (1969) (footnotes omitted); United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) [hereinafter cited as United States v. Alcoa].
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jurisdiction to prescribe rules directly applicable to the corpora-
tion."
A corporation may be concurrently subject to jurisdiction where
it is incorporated and where it does business. Furthermore, a
particular State may construe the nationality of subsidiaries as
identical to that of a parent MNE, even if they have been incor-
porated elsewhere.45
The scope of the territorial principle is not limited to the
subjective principle. International law recognizes the rule that
when conduct outside a State's borders has a substantial effect
within its borders, the State may exercise jurisdiction under the
objective territorial principle." This concept, in conjunction with
the subjective territorial principle, may also result in the concur-
rent jurisdiction of both the State in which the event occurred
and the State in which the event caused a substantial effect.
The objective territorial principle has long been accepted in
United States courts, as exemplified by Judge Learned Hand's
statement in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America
[hereinafter referred to as United States v. Alcoa] :
The only question open is whether Congress intended to impose
the liability, and whether our own Constitution permitted it to
do so: as a court of the United States, we cannot look beyond
our own law. . . . We should not impute to Congress an intent
to punish all whom its courts can catch, for conduct which has
no consequences within the United States . . . . On the other
hand, it is settled law. . . that any state may impose liabilities,
even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside
its borders that has consequences within its borders which the
state reprehends; and these liabilities other states will ordinarily
recognize."
The court held that defendant, Aluminum Ltd., had violated
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Aluminum Ltd., a Cana-
dian corporation organized to take over Alcoa properties in Can-
ada, was found guilty of conspiring with other foreign corpora-
tions to control imports of aluminum products into the United
States.
44. RESTATEMENT § 27 & comment (d). See also the Reporter's Note to § 27.
45. RESTATEMENT § 37; OPPENHEIM, supra note 36, § 145.
46. RESTATEMENT § 18; cf. OPPENHEIM, supra note 36, § 147.
47. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
48. Id. at 443 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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The doctrine of substantial effects is also recognized by the
Restatement:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching
legal consequences to conduct that occurs outside its territory
and causes an effect within its territory, if either
(a) the conduct and its effects are generally recognized as
constituent elements of a crime or tort under the law of states
that have reasonably developed legal systems, or
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of
activity to which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the terri-
tory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable
result of the conduct outside the territory and (iv) the rule is not
inconsistent with the principles of justice generally recognized
by states that have reasonably developed legal systems.49
Where the result in the United States violates federal securities
laws, the strong federal policy prohibiting political contributions
by corporations, or state law governing corporations, political
payments abroad can be viewed as either criminal or tortious in
themselves or as creating actionable substantial effects. Foreign
political payments cause substantial effects in the United States
when the value of an MNE's stock has been affected by the pay-
ment or by the disclosure of the transaction. In addition, such
payments contravene the strong statutory policy which is exem-
plified by legislation prohibiting domestic political contributions
by corporations."
The United States has been the principal proponent of the
objective territorial principle." Most States, including those of
the European Economic Community [hereinafter referred to as
EEC], currently recognize the validity of this doctrine.2 This is
particularly pertinent in light of the operations of an MNE, which
often result in simultaneous effects in several States. The most
obvious example of an effect is the impact of MNE operations on
shareholders and creditors.
Not all States are satisfied with the objective territorial prin-
49. RESTATEMENT § 18.
50. See note 4 supra.
The courts have applied the United States' securities laws to foreign nationals; see,
e.g., Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972);
Comment, The Transnational Reach of Rule 10b-5, 121 U. PA. L. Rav. 1363 (1973). In
most instances, however, the regulation has been of foreign corporations registered on
American exchanges and/or involving American purchasers.
51. RESTATEMENT § 18; United States v. Alcoa.
52. Griffin, supra note 2, at 405.
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ciple. In 1967, prior to entering the EEC, Britain issued a strong
statement decrying the application of the effects doctrine by the
EEC in antitrust matters. The British government, at least at the
time, felt that jurisdiction should be exercised over foreign corpo-
rations only when they were "carrying on business" or "residing"
in that State. It was felt that subsidiaries organized under a dif-
ferent jurisdiction should not be supervised as would the parent
"unless it can be shown that the subsidiary is the agent for the
parent."53
An alternative means of obtaining jurisdiction within the
confines of the territorial principle has been referred to as "lifting
the corporate veil."" This concept holds the parent MNE and its
subsidiaries to be parts of a single entity. In this manner, a State
with territorial jurisdiction over either the parent or the subsidi-
ary can claim valid jurisdiction over the foreign segment of the
MNE. Although this method has primarily been employed by the
home State of the parent corporation in order to reach the subsid-
iary, it has been suggested that the process may well be used by
host States to obtain jurisdiction over the parent enterprise.5
In many instances, in the "balance-of-payments controls,
securities regulation, tax policy, and national-security-related
export controls,"56 the home State "treats the local parent and
the foreign subsidiary as a single enterprise and thereby attempts
to control the activity of the foreign subsidiary."5 Therefore,
where a foreign subsidiary has participated in a transaction at the
behest of, or as the financial conduit for, the parent MNE, the
activity will be traced back to the parent. Often this will be a
United States MNE, in which the prospective plaintiff is a share-
holder. Professor Griffin has examined the use of such a theory
by host States to give them some control over the parent corpora-
tion. He concludes that a carefully delineated legal structure
which does not accurately portray the distribution of manage-
ment and financial control will not shield a corporation from
liability since a State's judiciary will endeavor to pierce the cor-
porate veil.
53. Excursus, British Aide-Mkmoire to the Commission of the European Commu-
ties, dated October 20, 1969, cited in Brownlie, supra note 41, at 305.
54. Griffin, supra note 2, at 383.
55. Id. at 407.
56. Id. at 377 (footnotes omitted).
57. Id.
58. Id.
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Governments and courts are not unaware of these relationships
nor of the problems of affixing responsibility for corporate ac-
tions on those who in fact control the corporation. Consequently,
many nations have resorted to "lifting" the corporate veil in an
attempt to affix responsibility more properly. In those instances
in which a host country treats the local subsidiary and the for-
eign parent corporation as a single entity, the legal fiction of
separate personality based upon separate incorporation is ig-
nored in order to deal with the "real" as opposed to the "legal"
status of the entities.5 9
This reasoning can be applied by United States courts when a
United States corporation utilizes a foreign subsidiary to channel
corporate assets for political contributions abroad. In such cases,
it is necessary to show the intent of the MNE or the direct benefit
to it.
The International Court of Justice passed upon the concept
of "lifting the corporate veil" in The Case Concerning Barcelona
Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd."' [hereinafter referred
to as Barcelona Traction]. In that case, Belgian shareholders
had a preponderant interest in Sofina, which controlled another
Belgian company called Sidro. Sidro in turn controlled Barcelona
Traction, which was a holding company that partly or wholly
owned fourteen subsidiaries organized under Spanish and Cana-
dian laws. Barcelona Traction itself was incorporated in Canada,
where it had its headquarters.
Belgium requested that the Court "lift the veil" of Canadian
incorporation in order to permit the diplomatic protection of Bel-
gium to be invoked on behalf of Belgian shareholders. The Court
rejected Belgium's argument, ruling that Belgium had no stand-
ing to intervene; it "lacked a legal interest in the subject matter
of the claim because the acts complained of affected the interests
of the company rather than the rights of the shareholders vis-a-
vis the corporation."'" The Court stated that since the holding
company was still in existence, the shareholders could look only
to the State of incorporation, Canada, when requesting diplo-
matic protection."
The Court in Barcelona Traction was concerned with deter-
mining which State could properly extend diplomatic protection
59. Id. at 382-83 (footnotes omitted).
60. [1970] I.C.J. 3.
61. Griffin, supra note 2, at 384.
62. [1970] I.C.J. 42.
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and not which State could regulate the corporation. The Court
indicated a limited acceptance of "lifting the corporate veil" or
"disregarding the legal entity":
the process of lifting the veil, being an exceptional one admitted
by municipal law in respect of an institution of its own making,
is equally admissible to play a similar role in international law.
It follows that on the international plane also there may in prin-
ciple be special circumstances which justify the lifting of the veil
in the interest of shareholders."
In a separate opinion, Judge Jessup suggested that the criteria for
selecting which State had jurisdiction may have been too rigid.
He recognized that the effects doctrine was gaining broader ac-
ceptance:
There is a trend in the direction of extending the jurisdictional
power of the State to deal with foreign enterprises which have
contact with the State's territorial domain; ". . . all that can
be required of a State is that it should not overstep the limits
which international law places upon its jurisdiction; within
these limits, its title to exercise jurisdiction rests in its sover-
eignty.")26
Judge Jessup suggested that courts look to the "economic
reality" of the transaction in question and to the "overwhelm-
ingly dominant feature." In Barcelona Traction this feature was,
in Judge Jessup's opinion, the economic interest of Belgian share-
holders rather than the incorporation in Canada.65 Professor Grif-
fin agrees with Judge Jessup, and suggests that
the majority opinion rejected the more flexible "genuine connec-
tion" principle expressed in Judge Jessup's opinion which deter-
mines the nationality of a company by reference to real and
effective links between the company and the state. . . .Fac-
tors to be considered would include location of factories, em-
ployment of labor, payment of taxes, location of decision-
making, and place of incorporation.6
The broad interpretation of this view would permit almost any
national court to find sufficient connections or links with its own
country to invoke jurisdiction. Thus, the home State of a parent
MNE could reach a foreign subsidiary abroad which has caused
63. Id. at 40.
64. [1970] I.C.J. at 167 (Jessup, J., separate opinion) (citations omitted).
65. Id. at 169-70.
66. Griffin, supra note 2, at 386.
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an impact domestically or the host country of a subsidiary could
reach a parent corporation which has acted through the subsidi-
ary. In the context of political payments, a host country where the
payment was made or attempted could reach beyond the local
subsidiary which tendered the offer and sanction the parent
MNE. Similarly, the State where the parent is incorporated
might construe the subsidiary's conduct as that of the parent and
invoke its own laws for the protection of the parent corporation's
shareholders. In such a case the separate structure of the compa-
nies would be disregarded and they would be viewed as a single
entity.
Overlapping of the territorial principles and the nationality
principle gives rise to problems of comity between States. If a
United States court accepts jurisdiction over a shareholder suit,
a potential problem is that the foreign State in which the transac-
tion took place may choose to intervene. The host State of the
subsidiary could assert jurisdiction under the traditional basis of
territoriality. This would in no way diminish the jurisdiction of
the United States courts, but where an adjudication had already
been made by the foreign court considerations of comity would
be relevant. If a foreign decision were contrary to allegations ad-
vanced in the United States court, principles of comity might
require that the foreign judgment be recognized in the United
States court.
In Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc.,7 a shareholder
derivative suit was brought under rule 10b-568 of the rules and
regulations promulgated pursuant to section 10(b) of the Act."
The complaint alleged that material misrepresentations were in-
cluded in a proxy solicitation which asked for shareholder ap-
proval of the amalgamation and nationalization of the defendant
company in Zambia. A Zambian court had approved the transac-
tion. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania" refused to recognize the Zambian decree as a limi-
tation on the Securities and Exchange Commission rules and held
that the defendant had violated rule 10b-5 by making misrepre-
sentations in the proxy solicitation. 71 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit also found a violation of 10b-5, but
67. 458 F.2d 255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972).
68. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
70. 322 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Pa., 1970).
71. Id. at 1351.
1975]
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
reversed as to the effect of the Zambian decree and held that the
foreign decree had to be recognized. 72
It appears that a derivative suit would be prevented when a
foreign jurisdiction has acquitted the parties involved or has
found no violation of the criminal or civil laws of that jurisdiction.
The legality of an act under the laws of the foreign state, as well
as a number of other factors, must be considered by a court when
an issue of comity arises. Among the relevant considerations are:
(1) whether any other court has competence over the offense.
(2) whether the offense is legal where committed.
(3) whether the decree would be enforceable.
(4) whether the judgment might encourage retaliation.
(5) whether the state has a greater stake in the regulation of
given conduct than the other states affected. 73
It is nevertheless true that where the application of a State's own
law would conflict with that of a State having concurrent jurisdic-
tion, the former may properly intervene unless it would violate
principles of international law.74
Section 40 of the Restatement suggests that the following
limitations be considered in moderating a State's enforcement of
its municipal law:
a) vital national interests of each of the states,
b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent
enforcement actions would impose upon the person,
c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in
the territory of the other states,
d) the nationality of the person, and
e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state
can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule
prescribed by the state.7 1
The official comments to section 40 add that in the case of the
nationality of a corporation "[t]o the extent that the exercise of
jurisdiction relates to the conduct of persons controlling a corpo-
ration, or who are its officers or agents, the nationality of such
72. See Comment, Scienter, Comity and the U.S. Securities Law, Kohn v. American
Climax, Inc., 5 LAW. & POL. INT'L Bus. 1042, 1054 (1973).
73. 10 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 150, 156 (1971).
74. RESTATEMENT § 39. Where the foreign decision-making body is alleged to be the
recipient of the bribe an American court may question the competency of that foreign
jurisdiction to make a proper adjudication of the matter. In such an instance, there may
be a less compelling reason to give the foreign decree final effect in an American court.
75. Id. § 4o.
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persons is also a factor to be considered."7 In the case of political
payments abroad, their legality in the country where they are
made should be considered in granting extraterritorial applica-
tion of a State's domestic law which prohibits such conduct. This
should not in and of itself preclude any action, however, once the
State has determined that a violation of its own law exists."
Where the United States seeks to apply its domestic laws extra-
territorially, courts must initially determine whether Congress
intended this particular legislation to be so applied.,
The Extraterritorial Effect of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
A foreign issuer may choose to register securities with the
Securities and Exchange Commission [hereinafter referred to as
SEC] under section 12(b)79 and comply with the standard
registration requirements of the Act. The issuer may, however, be
exempt from registration in certain circumstances.
Rule 12g3-2,11 promulgated by the SEC pursuant to section
12(g) 1 of the Act offers two basic exemptions. First, securities
held by no more than 300 persons residing within the United
States need not be registered. (Should the number of holders of
a class of securities be reduced to less than 300 holders residing
within the United States, registration may be terminated.)82 Sec-
ond, regardless of the number of United States residents in-
volved, a security may be exempt if certain information is fur-
nished to the SEC on a periodic basis. The information must
include what the issuer
(a) has made public pursuant to the law of the country of its
domicile or in which it is incorporated or organized,
(b) has filed with a stock exchange or which its securities are
traded on and which was made public by such exchange, or
(c) has distributed to its security holders;3
76. Id. comment (d).
77. Id. § 39. A State having jurisdiction to prescribe or enforce a rule of law is not
precluded from exercising its own jurisdiction solely because this would require a person
to engage in conduct subjecting him to liability under the law of another State which has
jurisdiction with respect to that conduct.
78. RESTATEMENT § 38; United States v. Alcoa.
79. 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) (1970).
80. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2 (1975).
81. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1970).
82. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(a) (1975).
83. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b)(1)(i) (1975).
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3. The information required to be furnished. . . is that about
which investors ought reasonably to be informed with respect to
the issue and its subsidiaries concerning: the financial condition
or results of operations; changes in business; acquisitions or
dispositions of assets; issuance, redemption or acquisitions of
their securities; changes in management or control; the granting
of options or the payment of other remuneration to directors or
officers; transactions with directors, officers or principal secu-
rity holders; and other information about which investors ought
reasonably to be informed.'
Although the SEC is concerned with the protection of United
States investors, a foreign issuer need not register if the informa-
tion he furnishes elsewhere is substantially similar to that in-
tended to be disclosed by the Act.
It must be noted, however, that exemptions are not available
where:
(1) more than 50 percent of the outstanding voting securities
of such issuer are held of record either directly or through voting
trust certificate or depository receipts by residents of the United
States and
(2) the business of such issuer is administered principally in
the United States or 50 percent or more of the members of its
Board of Directors are residents of the United States.,
The Act requires the same degree of disclosure by a foreign sub-
sidiary which is substantially owned or controlled by a domestic
parent as it requires of the parent itself. In such circumstances
an issuer would not be construed as a "foreign issuer" for pur-
poses of exemption under the Act.
The alternative registration requirements for foreign issuers
who are not closely linked to the United States relieves them from
any conflict between foreign disclosure requirements and those of
the Act. According to one commentator, this "is a good example
of the kind of flexible, specially adapted rule needed to assure
proper extraterritorial application of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934."86
With respect to foreign transactions, section 30(b) 7 states
that the Act's provisions and any rules or regulations promul-
gated thereunder
84. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b)(3) (10975).
85. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(e) (1975).
86. Note, supra note 43, at 111.
87. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1970).
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shall not apply to any person insofar as he transacts a business
in securities without the jurisdiction of the United States, unless
he transacts such business in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate to prevent the evasion of this chapter.,
Any doubt as to whether this section excluded all transactions
which occurred outside of the United States, whether or not the
purchasers were United States residents, was laid to rest by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook.89 The court held that section 30(b)
"was not meant to exempt transactions conducted outside of the
United States unless they are part of a 'business in securities'."9
"Business in securities" was construed strictly, the court stating
that the section "does not preclude extraterritorial application of
the Exchange Act to persons who engage in isolated foreign trans-
actions."9"
In Schoenbaum, the court found subject matter jurisdiction
based upon an extraterritorial application of the Act. A derivative
suit was brought by a United States shareholder of Banff, a Cana-
dian corporation registered on the American Exchange. The com-
plaint alleged a violation of section 10(b) of the Act and of rule
10b-5 by defendant Aquitaine. Aquitaine, a Canadian corpora-
tion, had acquired control of Banff through a tender offer to
Banff's Canadian and United States shareholders. Banff and
Aquitaine embarked upon a joint venture to develop oil in Can-
ada. Banff issued a substantial amount of its treasury shares to
Aquitaine under conditions which the plaintiffs, minority share-
holders (Aquitaine now being the marjority holder in Banff), al-
leged were at a price far less than the real value of the stock.2 The
Second Circuit held that subject matter jurisdiction did exist
over Aquitaine but that the plaintiffs had failed to show a 10b-5
violation. 3 On reconsideration en banc, the court upheld subject
matter jurisdiction but reversed as to the plaintiffs' failure to
state a cause of action and held that a triable issue of fact existed
under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.14
88. Id.
89. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
90. Id. at 208.
91. Id. at 207.
92. Id. at 204-06.
93. Id. at 214-15.
94. 405 F.2d 215, 220 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
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A transaction will not be exempted from compliance with the
Act unless the broker-dealer is one "in the business" outside of
the United States. In so construing the Act, the Second Circuit
specifically upheld its extraterritorial application. This was done
so that United States investors might be protected even though
the transaction was a foreign one "among foreign participants
involving the sale of foreign securities traded on a domestic ex-
change . ..where the noxious effects were felt in the United
States."95
In Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell,"8
the Second Circuit again gave extraterritorial effect to the Act
and rule 10b-5 in an action brought by two corporate plaintiffs,
a United States corporation and its wholly-owned British subsi-
diary. The complaint alleged that the plaintiffs were induced to
purchase stock of a British corporation controlled by Maxwell, a
British citizen, at an inflated value due to false representations
made to them in Britain and the United States. The transaction
was completed in Britain." The court found that "substantial
misrepresentations were made in the United States" 8 and held
that the Act was applicable to transactions outside of the United
States when fraudulent acts had taken place within the United
States. Protection is thus not limited to United States securi-
ties.9 Where there are a number of factual connections linking
transactions with United States investors, issuers, underwriters,
or activities, the Act will be construed to protect the victims of a
fraudulent scheme.
Two recent cases before the Second Circuit have further ex-
panded the extraterritorial application of the Act. Bersch v.
Drexel Firestone, Inc.'°° was a class action brought in the South-
ern District of New York on behalf of all shareholders in defen-
dant International Overseas Service, Ltd. (IOS), a Canadian cor-
poration, who were either United States residents living abroad
or foreigners. The complaint alleged numerous irregularities in a
series of three offerings of IOS stock. The offerings were intended
to be made only to foreigners outside of the United States and
outside of the jurisdictional scope of the Act. Two of the under-
95. Note, supra note 43, at 101-02.
96. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1968).
97. Id. at 1330-33.
98. Id. at 1337.
99. See also Comment, supra note 50.
100. 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975).
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writers of the principal offering were United States banking
houses, Drexel Firestone and Smith, Barney, which both had
offices abroad. In addition, the prospectuses were prepared by
Arthur Andersen & Co., a United States accounting firm. The
complaint alleged that the "prospectuses failed to reveal illegal
activities by IOS and its officers which had seriously damaged the
company."'' In a footnote to its opinion, the court explained
these as including "the participation by IOS officers in the smug-
gling of currency outside of developing countries in violation of
their restrictive currency laws. As a result of this activity IOS had
been barred from doing business in several of these countries."',"
The court examined the Congressional intent of the Act and
held, inter alia, that
[t]he anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws:
(1) Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans
resident in the United States whether or not acts (or culpable
failures to act) of material importance occurred in this country;
and
(2) Apply to losses from sales of securities to Americans
resident abroad if, but only if, acts (or culpable failures to act)
of material importance in the United States have significantly
contributed thereto; but
(3) Do not apply to losses from sales of securities to for-
eigners outside the United States unless acts (or culpable fail-
ures to act) within the United States directly caused such
losses. 113
There are thus a number of factual situations which may give rise
to an extraterritorial application of the Act under the expansive
view taken in Bersch.
The Second Circuit specifically passed on the contention
that the acts in question precipitated invoking the Act when they
merely caused an "adverse general effect" on the United States
market for such securities."4 The court agreed that there may well
have been "an unfortunate financial effect in the United States"
as a result of the defendants' activities but refused to hold that
such "generalized effects . ..were sufficient to confer subject
matter jurisdiction over a damage suit by a foreigner under the
101. Id. at 981.
102. Id. at 981 n.15.
103. Id. at 993.
104. Id. at 987.
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anti-frauds provisions. '"105 This would not preclude such an
argument by a United States investor, but is not available as the
sole ground for relief requested by a foreign investor.
In a companion case decided the same day as Bersch, IIT v.
Vencap Ltd.,"' the Second Circuit held that subject matter juris-
diction did exist in a suit by a Luxembourg investment trust
against a Bahamian corporation for fraud. The federal securities
laws were held to apply to foreign investors where "the United
States was used as a base for manufacturing fraudulent security
devices for export."'0° Among other activities within the United
States, defendant's New York law firm prepared the purchase
agreement in New York and transactionq were directed, received,
and recorded in a New York office."' On this basis, an action
could be maintained by the SEC "to prevent the concoction of
securities frauds in the United States for export" or "for damages
or recission by a defrauded foreign individual.""' The Second
Circuit did, however, limit jurisdiction to actual frauds:
Our ruling on this basis of jurisdiction is limited to the
perpetration of fraudulent acts themselves and does not extend
to mere preparatory activities or the failure to prevent fraudu-
lent acts where the bulk of the activity was performed in foreign
countries."10
Bersch and IT were considered by the District Court for the
Southern District of New York in F. O.F. Proprietary Funds, Ltd.
v. Arthur Young & Company."' Plaintiff, a Canadian mutual
fund and subsidiary of IOS, brought a class action against a
United States accounting firm and a United States corporation
which alleged misrepresentations in an offering. Plaintiff had
purchased debentures of Farrington Overseas Corporation
(FOC), a Delaware corporation formed as an overseas investment
and loan company. FOC was a wholly owned subsidiary of
F.M.C., a Massachusetts corporation with executive offices in
New York. None of the debentures were to be sold in the United
States or to nationals or residents of the United States and Can-
ada, and they were not registered under the federal securities
105. Id. at 988.
106. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
107. Id. at 1017.
108. Id. at 1018.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 95,296 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 1975).
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laws. All of the proceeds were to be used to develop overseas
properties. Based upon these representations, and the further
condition that each underwriter offering the debentures would
sign a covenant expressly agreeing that no offers or sales would
be made in the United States to nationals or residents thereof, the
SEC issued a no-action letter and agreed that the debentures
need not be registered. The court found that the plaintiff had
purchased the debentures in direct violation of federal securities
regulations and contrary to the specific agreement between the
SEC and the defendants. The court also declared that the pur-
chase was "predominantly foreign" and that plaintiff was "not
within the group of intended or lawful offerees of the FOC Deben-
tures since it purchased them in direct violation of the Federal
regulations, the SEC conditions and the express restrictions
1rominently placed on the Offering Circular.' '12
The court held that under Bersch and IT plaintiff was a
"foreigner" who could invoke the federal securities laws only
where acts within the United States "directly caused such
losses." It found that all relevant acts had occurred abroad and
"[t]he fact that the issuer, FOC and the other defendants are
American is of little independent significance."1 3 The fact that
the purchase by plaintiff was itself a violation of federal regula-
tions was stressed; this alone may be sufficient to foreclose all
relief under the Act. It must be emphasized, however, that the
court will not hesitate to give extraterritorial effect to the Act in
the proper circumstances. The district court's refusal to intervene
in F. O.F. is consistent with Bersch, IT and their predecessors.
Before giving the Act extraterritorial effect, a court will examine
the facts to determine whether the transactions involved had suf-
ficient connections with the United States.
IV. ACTIONS UNDER UNITED STATES LAW
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Regardless of their legality in the United States or abroad,
foreign political contributions may embroil a corporation in liti-
gation when that corporation fails to comply with the disclosure
requirements of the Act."'
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. 15 U.S.C. § 78a, et seq. (1970) [hereinafter cited as the Act].
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Most United States MNE's are public issue corporations reg-
istered on national stock exchanges. In addition to an initial reg-
istration requirement for each new issue, the issuer must periodi-
cally update information required by the SEC."5 Section 13(a)"0
of the Act requires that every issuer, in conformity with the rules
and regulations set forth by the SEC," 7
shall file...
(1) such information and documents (and such copies
thereof) as the Commission shall require to keep reasonably
current the information and documents required to be included
in or filed with an application or registration statement...
(2) such annual reports (and such copies thereof), certi-
fied if required by the rules and regulations of the Commission
by independent public accountants, and such quarterly reports
(and such copies thereof), as the Commission may prescribe."'
Rule 13a-11'9 of the rules and regulations requires annual reports
to be filed with the SEC by every issuer. The quality of the
information required to be disclosed in the initial registration and
in all subsequent reports is dictated by section 12120 of the Act and
the rules promulgated under that section. Rule 12b-20'11 requires
that:
in addition to the information expressly required to be included
in a statement or report, there shall be added such further mate-
rial information, if any, as may be necessary to make the re-
quired statements, in the light of the circumstances under which
they are made not misleading. 2
"Material" is defined by the rules as "those matters as to which
an average prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed be-
fore buying or selling the security registered.'1 23
The continuous reporting requirements of the Act can be
interpreted to require that a corporation which may not have
made political payments prior to its registration must disclose
115. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1970).
116. Id.
117. § 23(a) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78w (1970), empowers the SEC to promulgate
rules and regulations for the enforcement of the Act.
118. 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1970).
119. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 (1975).
120. 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1970).
121. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (1975).
122. Id.
123. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2(j) (1975).
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subsequent payments in the course of its annual report to the
SEC. The payment of millions of corporate dollars, if not con-
strued to be either an unauthorized expenditure or "misleading"
when undisclosed, is at least a matter about which the "average
investor ought reasonably to be informed."' The liability for
misleading statements is expressly set out by the Act:
Any person who shall make or cause to be made in any applica-
tion, report, or document filed pursuant to this chapter or any
rule or regulation thereunder . . . which statement was at the
time and in the light of the circumstances under which it was
made false or misleading with respect to any material fact, shall
be liable to any person (not knowing that such statement was
false or misleading) who, in reliance upon such statement, shall
have purchased or sold a security at a price which was affected
by such statement, for damages caused by such reliance.12
A stockholder who shows damages caused by reliance on false
information has an action against the persons responsible for fil-
ing the information with the SEC. Suit must be brought before
the federal district courts of the United States.1 21
Furthermore, the Act makes it unlawful "for any director or
officer of . . . any issuer required to file any document, report,
or information under this chapter or any rule or regulation
thereunder without just cause to hinder, delay, or obstruct the
making or filing of any such document, report, or information.' 2 7
Since a shareholder derivative suit is warranted where the act of
a director or officer has been directly prohibited by statute or is
void as against public policy,' 2 shareholders may successfully
maintain an action against a director or officer who knowingly
fails to disclose foreign payments. Hindrance, delay, or obstruc-
tion by a director or officer is also expressly prohibited by the
statute and is ultra vires and void. 29 A shareholder may bring an
124. Id.
125. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970). In addition, where it finds a violation of the Act or any
rules or regulations thereunder, the Commission may suspend or withdraw the registration
of a security. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(c) (1970).
126. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).
127. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(c) (1970).
128. Berkey v. Third Avenue Ry. Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58 (1926); Schwab v.
E.G. Potter Co., 194 N.Y. 409, 87 N.E. 670 (1909).
129. Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct.
1942), aff'd mem., 267 App. Div. 890, 47 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1944). N.Y. Bus. CoRp. L. §
720(a)(1) (McKinney 1963) provides for derivative action by a shareholder against any
director or officer to compel an accounting for:
(A) The neglect of, or failure to perform, or other violation of his duties in the
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action in the name of the corporation "to procure a judgement in
[the corporation's] favor against an incumbent or former officer
or director of the corporation for loss or damage due to his unau-
thorized act." 3'
Failure to disclose foreign political contributions may also be
a violation of section 14(e) 3 1 and the rules and regulations under
that section which govern proxy solicitations through the use of
mails or interstate commerce.1 32 This provision states that:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue state-
ment of a material fact or omit to state any material fact neces-
sary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or to
engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or
practices, in connection with any tender offer or request or invi-
tation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in oppo-
sition to or in favor of any such offer, request or invitation. 3
The rules and regulations require that proxy solicitations be ac-
companied by various annual reports which include financial
statements "as will in the opinion of the management adequately
reflect the financial position of the issuer at the end of each such
year and the results of its operations for each such year."'34 Such
statements must reflect any significant differences from prior
statements '35 and be certified by independent public accoun-
tants.' 0 No proxy statement can contain information
which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under
which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any
material fact, or which omits to state any material fact neces-
sary in order to make the statements therein not false or mis-
leading or necessary to correct any statement in any earlier com-
munication with respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the
same meeting or subject matter which has become false or mis-
leading.'37
management and disposition of corporate assests committed to his charge.
(B) The acquisition by himself, transfer to others, loss or waste of corporate
assets due to any neglect of, or failure to perform, or other violations of his
duties. Id.
130. N.Y. Bus. CORP. L. § 203(a)(2) (McKinney 1963).
131. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970).
132. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
133. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970).
134. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b)(1) (1975).
135. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b)(2) (1975).
136. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3(b)(3) (1975).
137. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (1975).
[Vol. II:l1
MNE "PA YOFFS"
A financial statement accompanying a proxy solicitation which
fails to reflect a payment of several million dollars in corporate
funds may be in violation of the rules promulgated under section
14 of the Act.' Enforcement of this section, like section 13, is by
an action pursuant to section 18 of the Act.'
Finally, with respect to the sale or purchase of any security,
section 10(b) of the Act and rule 10b-5 make it unlawful to use
the mails, interstate commerce, or any facility on a national ex-
change:
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person. 0
If a corporation which planned to export material to a foreign
country offered its securities for sale and attracted buyers on the
basis of a series of government contracts of purchase made or
about to be made in such foreign markets, failure to disclose the
fact that such contracts were made in exchange for substantial
bribes to government officials may be a violation of 10b-5. A
shareholder who purchased such securities might have a remedy
under 10b-5 when such payments are disclosed or when the corpo-
ration declares bankruptcy.
Where a corporation is listed on an exchange, it will normally
be required to disclose information to the SEC concerning its
finances. A shareholder can force disclosure of contributions as
either information about which an "average investor ought rea-
sonably to be informed" or "material" information. He may also
bring an action against any director or officer who fails to disclose
such information, if he has suffered a loss as a result of his reli-
ance on false information. In addition, where a director knowingly
distorts or fails to disclose what he knows to be material, an act
on behalf of the corporation itself may be brought. Information
not required as part of a periodic report may still be necessary
138. See Schedule 14A, Rules and Regulations Under the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1975), for the specific information required in a proxy
statement.
139. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970).
140. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
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where there is a proxy solicitation. A shareholder can also bring
an action if there has been a failure to disclose the contribution
in the proxy solicitation. In extraordinary circumstances involv-
ing a fraudulent misuse of the information, a shareholder who has
been injured can seek a remedy under rule 10b-5.
State Law
A number of shareholders have filed derivative suits against
corporate directors for political payments abroad under state
laws.' A derivative suit brought by shareholders has long been
recognized as a valid vindication of the rights of the corporation
where its directors or officers have injured the corporation by
their conduct.' Corporate directors and officers are liable to the
corporation if they breach their fiduciary duty and fail to act "in
good faith with the degree of diligence, care and skill which ordi-
nary prudent men would exercise under similar circumstances in
like positions."'4
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that a violation of section 610 of the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act, as amended,' may give rise to a derivative action for
director's breach of fiduciary duty under state law in Miller v.
American Telephone and Telegraph Company.' Miller, a stock-
141. See text accompanying notes 7 & 13 supra; Gall v. Exxon Corp. 75 Civ. 368
(S.D.N.Y., filed July 28, 1975).
142. Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1855). Some states have specifically
authorized such suits by statute. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. L. § 626 (McKinney 1963).
143. N.Y. Bus. CORP. L. § 717 (McKinney 1963); Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65 (1880). It
should be noted that derivative actions must often meet statutory requirements. The
foremost of these is the contemporaneous ownership rule, which requires a shareholder to
have owned the stock at the time the alleged injury took place as well as at the time of
suit. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. L. § 626(b) (McKinney 1963). Moreover, before a suit may
be instituted, the corporation must have refused to bring suit itself against its directors
or officers for breach of duty. Such demand and refusal must be stated in the pleadings
with particularity, "or the reasons for not making such effort." N.Y. Bus. CORP. L. § 626
(c) (McKinney 1963). See also Jordan v. Hartness, 230 N.C. 718, 55 S.E.2d 484 (1949).
Where such a demand would be futile, as where the corporation is still in the control
of the directors accused of misfeasance, demand and refusal is unnecessary. Jacobson v.
Brooklyn Lumber Co., 184 N.Y. 152, 176 N.E. 1075 (1906). It would appear that in a
derivative action brought against a corporation for foreign payments, a complaint could
reasonably state reasons why prior demand would have been useless.
In addition, where the shareholder or shareholders bringing the action hold less than
five per cent of the outstanding shares of any class, or the value of such shares is less than
$50,000, the corporation may require such shareholders to post security for reasonable
expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by the corporation in defending the suit. N.Y.
Bus. CORP. L. § 627 (McKinney 1963).
144. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972).
145. 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974).
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holder of AT&T, brought a derivative action in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania alleging that the corporation's failure to
recover a debt of $1,500,000 owed by the Democratic National
Convention for services rendered during the 1968 Democratic
National Convention was a violation of section 610 and therefore
a breach of the director's fiduciary duties.' 48 Jurisdiction was in-
voked on the basis of diversity pursuant to § 28 U.S.C. 1332.147
The district court dismissed the complaint on defendant's motion
for failure to state a cause of action upon which relief could be
granted."' The Third Circuit reversed and held that under New
York law the alleged violation of section 610 did give rise to an
action against directors for a breach of fiduciary duty to the cor-
poration.'49
The court examined New York law, since it was the state of
incorporation, and found that "even though committed to benefit
the corporation, illegal acts may amount to a breach of fiduciary
duty in New York.""15 Furthermore, an action which is solely a
violation of state public policy may also constitute a breach by
directors.'51 In Miller, the plaintiffs claimed that the debt owed
by the Democratic National Committee was, in effect, an illegal
campaign contribution. 152 In addition to citing New York law, the
court gave consideration to the Congressional intent underlying
section 610. This intent was summarized in United States v.
CIO ' as: "(1) to destroy the influence of corporations over elec-
tions through financial contributions and (2) to check the prac-
tice of using corporate funds to benefit political parties without
the consent of the stockholders."'5 4 These policies, in conjunction
with New York law governing corporate behavior, present strong
reasons for permitting derivative suits by shareholders:
The fact that shareholders are within the class for whose protec-
tion the statute was enacted gives force to the argument that the
alleged breach of that statute should give rise to a course of
action in those shareholders to force the return to the corpora-
146. Id. at 761.
147. Id.
148. 364 F. Supp. 648 (E.D. Pa. 1973), rev'd, 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1974).
149. 507 F.2d 759, 761.
150. Id. at 762, citing Roth v. Robertson, 64 Misc. 343 (Sup. Ct. 1909).
151. 507 F.2d at 762-63, citing Abrams v. Allen, 297 N.Y. 52, 74 N.E. 2d 305 (1974).
152. 507 F.2d at 762-63.
153. 335 U.S. 106 (1948).
154. 507 F.2d at 763.
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tion of illegally contributed funds. Since political contributions
by corporations can be checked and shareholder control over the
political use of general corporate funds effectuated only if direc-
tors are restrained from causing the corporation to violate the
statute, such a violation seems a particularly appropriate basis
for finding breach of the defendant directors' fiduciary duty to
the corporation. Under such circumstances, the directors cannot
be insulated from liability on the ground that contribution was
made in the exercise of sound business judgment."'
It would appear that where a contribution of corporate funds
violates a particular statute or contravenes strong public policy
directors may be held liable for a breach of fiduciary duty. Al-
though a contribution to a foreign political party does not violate
section 610, it may well be in contravention of those policies
underlying New York law and section 610 itself, since the section
was enacted to protect shareholders and to control the power of
corporations. Legislation now being contemplated by Congress
which would specifically prohibit foreign political contributions"'
could also be invoked by a shareholder in a state action.
Although Miller was decided prior to the 1974 amendments
to the Federal Election Campaign Act, shareholder suits under
section 610 have been considered by the Supreme Court. In Cort
v. Ash, 151 the Court held that section 610, as amended, did not
give rise to a private federal cause of action in a stockholder. The
statute, as amended, provided only for an administrative remedy
through the Federal Election Commission.15 The shareholders'
relief was limited to the applicable state law governing corpora-
tions.'59
[I]t is entirely appropriate to relegate respondent and others in
his situation to whatever remedy is created by state law. In
addition to the ultra vires action pressed here, . . . the use of
corporate funds in violation of federal law may, under the law
of some states, give rise to a cause of action for breach of fidu-
ciary duty.'6'
The Court refused to make that determination because the
plaintiff shareholders had amended their original complaint to
155. Id.
156. See note 11 supra.
157. 496 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1974).
158. 95 S. Ct. 2080 (1975).
159. Id. at 2087.
160. Id. at 2091, citing Miller, 507 F.2d 759.
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omit an alleged state cause of action, rather than post the security
required by state law. The security had been ordered by the dis-
trict court judge. '
In denying relief, the Court reemphasized the right of the
shareholders to pursue their state law claims. Such a claim could
be pursued before the federal district court pursuant to federal
diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1332 or under 28 U.S.C.
§1331 in conjunction with a claim arising under federal law. '62
It would appear from a study of the cases cited above that a
suit by shareholders against directors would state a cause of ac-
tion if it could be established that the foreign contribution vio-
lated some statute or contravened some strong public policy.
Once that nexus can be established, a court may apply the appro-
priate state's law governing the internal affairs of a corporation.
V. CONCLUSION
The disclosure of foreign political contributions by MNE's
has created great controversy. A number of questions exist as to
whether such conduct is or should be regulated by SEC disclosure
requirements, by legislative prohibition, or by shareholder suits.
Historically, there is a basis for prohibition analagous to the Fed-
eral Election Campaign Law regarding domestic contributions. In
addition to the fact that prohibition of foreign contributions is
premised on the same rationale as prohibition of domestic contri-
butions, foreign payments involve the problem of foreign rela-
tions-the sovereignty of both the States attempted to be
161. 95 S. Ct. at 2085 n.6.
162. While the Court did recognize such a state cause of action, it eroded the signifi-
cance of the policy which protects shareholders from corporate contributions made with-
out their consent in dicta. The Court relegated that policy, as announced in United States
v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948), as "at best a subsidiary purpose of § 610." The Cort decision
also suggested some strong policy reasons which may militate against recovery in a deriva-
tive suit:
[r]ecovery of derivative damages for violation of § 610 would not cure the
influence which the use of corporate funds in the first instance may have had
on a federal election. Rather, such a remedy would only permit directors in effect
to "borrow" corporate funds for a time; the later compelled repayment might
well not deter the initial violation and would certainly not decrease the impact
of the use of such funds upon an election already past.
95 S. Ct. at 2091. If a shareholder can analogize foreign political contributions to the facts
in Cort and Miller, he must be prepared to meet and overcome the Court's concern. This
may be particularly true where the corporation has profited substantially as a result of
the contribution itself since damages in favor of the corporation may be difficult to obtain.
In spite of this, injunctive relief against future payments should be available.
19751
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L.
influenced by the MNE's and those States which, through the
principles of territoriality and nationality, ordinarily regulate the
afffairs of the corporation.
Regulation itself must be examined to determine whether it
is consonant with, or a violation of, public international law.
There is authority for the extraterritorial application of a State's
domestic law on three general bases: nationality, subjective terri-
toriality (acts within a state), and objective territoriality. This
last principle has long been accepted in United States courts and
has recently gained acceptance-in the European Economic Com-
munity. It appears that in the future, due to the nature of an
MNE, more States will recognize that protection of their own
sovereignty may depend on the exertion of control through this
principle.
In any particular case there are a number of factors to be
considered before exercising jurisdiction. These include the num-
ber and significance of the effects within the State seeking juris-
diction, the identity of and injury claimed by the plaintiff, the
legality of the act where committed, the tax treatment given the
payment, and the conduits used for the payment. The recent
Bersch and IT cases give some indication of what factors will
convince a United States court to intervene where a violation of
the securities laws is pleaded. It appears that each case will be
examined on its facts to determine what acts resulted in a loss to
the shareholder and where they occurred. United States courts
should intervene when an MNE attempts to wield influence
abroad in a manner which is specifically prohibited domestically.
The United States government has a strong interest in regulating
conduct which can interfere with the territorial sovereignty of
foreign governments.
Anne C. Flannery
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